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 Money and Compliance 2 
Abstract 
Research has shown a robust tendency for people to underestimate their ability to get 
others to comply with their requests.  In five studies, we demonstrate that this 
underestimation-of-compliance effect is reduced when requesters offer money in 
exchange for compliance. In Studies 1 and 2, participants assigned to a no-incentive or 
monetary-incentive condition made actual requests of others. In both studies, requesters 
who offered no incentives underestimated the likelihood that those they approached 
would grant their requests; however, when requesters offered monetary incentives, this 
prediction error was mitigated.  In Studies 3-5, we present evidence in support of a model 
to explain the underlying mechanism for this attenuation effect. Studies 3 and 4 
demonstrate that offering monetary incentives activates a money-market frame.  In Study 
5, we find that this activation reduces the discomfort associated with asking, allowing 
requesters to more accurately assess the size of their request and, consequently, the 
likelihood of compliance.  
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For a dollar, would you…? 
How (we think) money influences compliance with our requests  
Have you ever offered someone gas money in exchange for a ride, or beer money 
in exchange for helping with a tough move? Maybe you’ve given too much money to 
someone who was going out to pick up lunch anyway and told them they could “keep the 
change” if they brought you back something, too.  Many of us do this, but why? Do we 
think we are less likely to be rejected when we offer money in exchange for compliance 
with a request?  If so, are we right?  
A simple request is a powerful tool of influence that often requires no additional 
incentive to elicit compliance. Yet, absent any exchange of money, people tend to 
underestimate their ability to get others to comply with their requests (Bohns, 2016; 
Bohns, Roghanizad & Xu, 2014; Flynn & Lake, 2008; Newark, Flynn & Bohns, 2014). In 
the initial demonstration of this phenomenon, Flynn and Lake (2008) had participants ask 
people to do them a favor.  Some participants asked random strangers to fill out a 
questionnaire or to lend them a cell phone, while others asked for donations for a charity 
run or for help finding a location on their college campus. In each case, participants 
substantially underestimated—often by as much as 50%—the number of people who 
would comply with their requests.  These findings have proved robust, having been 
replicated in the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, and China; by student and non-
student samples; in urban and suburban settings; with different measures of compliance; 
and using a variety of prosocial and unethical requests (Aaldering & Handgraaf, 2011; 
Bohns et al., 2011; Bohns et al., 2014; Flynn & Lake, 2008; Newark et al., 2014).   
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The explanation for this phenomenon is that requesters fail to appreciate the 
impact of social-emotional mechanisms of influence. But what about other mechanisms 
of influence, such as economic means?  Do requesters make the same error when 
attempting to influence others with money?  
In the current research, we hypothesize that offering money in exchange for 
compliance will moderate this robust social prediction error.  Previous research has found 
that when a request is framed as asking for a favor, pertinent social norms combined with 
the anxieties of asking lead requesters to overestimate the instrumental costs to targets of 
saying “yes” (Flynn, 2003, 2006; McGuire, 2003) and underestimate the social-emotional 
costs to targets of saying “no” (Bohns et al., 2011; Bohns et al., 2014; Flynn & Lake, 
2008; Newark et al., 2014).  This biased cost-benefit analysis leads requesters to expect—
erroneously—that rejection is imminent (Greenberg, 1980; Greenberg, Block & 
Silverman, 1971).  In exchanges involving money, however, the norms and emotions that 
bias requesters’ evaluations of a favor request are either reduced or eliminated entirely 
(Blau, 1986, 1994; Fiske, 1992; Kouchaki, Smith-Crowe, Brief, & Sousa, 2013; Pillutla 
& Chen, 1999).  Consequently, requesters who offer money in exchange for compliance 
should be less likely to commit this social prediction error. 
Why people underestimate compliance with favor requests 
Why do requesters tend to exaggerate the likelihood of rejection when asking for 
a favor?  One reason is the strong interaction norms that characterize these requests 
(Goffman, 1955, 1959, 1971; Goldschmidt, 1998; Grice, 1975).  Both predicted and 
actual compliance depend on assessments of the costs and benefits of compliance 
(Greenberg, 1980; Greenberg, Block & Silverman, 1971).  However, the implicit norms 
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of favor exchange encourage requesters to exaggerate just how much of an imposition 
they are actually proposing, whereas targets are encouraged to minimize it. When asking 
for a favor, requesters are expected to “save face” for both themselves and their targets by 
politely conveying their appreciation through apologies and expressions of gratitude 
(Brown & Levinson, 1987; Goffman, 1955, 1959, 1971).  The feelings of humility and 
thanks that should accompany even the smallest of favor requests increase requesters’ 
judgments about the costs of compliance (Blau, 1986, 1994; Flynn, 2003, 2006).   On the 
other hand, while requesters are encouraged to be appreciative and to avoid trivializing or 
taking for granted another’s help, targets wishing to be courteous are expected to 
downplay the effort or hassle that helping entails (Flynn, 2003; Grice, 1975).  Flynn 
(2003, 2006) has demonstrated that these interaction norms push requesters’ and targets’ 
subjective evaluations of the magnitude of a favor in opposite directions. In particular, 
requesters’ focus on expressing gratitude (“Thank you so much”; “I’m so sorry to 
impose…”) leads them to believe that what they are asking for is relatively large, while 
targets’ focus on graciously minimizing their contributions (“It’s no big deal”) leads them 
to believe that the request is relatively small.  Together, these politeness norms cause 
requesters to overestimate the instrumental costs of complying with a request relative to 
targets (Flynn, 2003; McGuire, 2003). 
 In addition to the norms of favor interactions, the anxiety and discomfort one 
often feels when asking for a favor also bias requesters’ estimation of the costs of 
compliance. Requesters put their self-esteem on the line and expose themselves to the 
possibility of rejection (Bohns & Flynn, 2010; DePaulo & Fisher, 1980; Fisher, Nadler & 
Whitcher-Alagna, 1982; Goffman, 1971). Even seemingly modest requests, such as 
 Money and Compliance 6 
asking for a seat on the subway, have been shown to cause requesters extreme distress 
(Milgram, 1974; Blass, 2009).  Using their emotions as information about the task, 
requesters are likely to assume that if it feels so unpleasant to ask for something, they 
must be asking for something imposing or unreasonable (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; 
Schwarz, 2011).  Further, negative emotions focus requesters’ attention on the 
undesirable consequences of complying—for example, the risks or costs to the target of 
saying “yes” (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Schwarz, 2000).   
Finally, requesters’ focus on their own anxieties also means that, while they 
exaggerate the instrumental costs a target incurs by saying “yes,” they tend to overlook 
important benefits of compliance.  In particular, the social-emotional costs a target incurs 
by saying “no” (and, consequently, avoids by saying “yes”) are considerable (Bohns & 
Flynn, 2015; Flynn, 2003, 2006; Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2005; Van Boven, 
Loewenstein, & Dunning, 2005; Van Boven, Loewenstein, Dunning, & Nordgren, 2013).  
Unable to assume the perspective of their targets, requesters in the throes of asking for a 
favor fail to appreciate how often targets will agree to requests—even those they would 
rather not grant—simply to escape the discomfort of refusing (Bohns et al., 2014; Flynn 
& Lake, 2008; Newark et al., 2014).   
 Altogether, the norms and emotions that characterize the act of asking for a favor 
lead requesters to overestimate the likelihood that targets will say “no” to their requests. 
However, offering money in exchange for compliance should mitigate many of these 
considerations, allowing requesters to more realistically assess the likelihood that their 
requests will be fulfilled.  
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Why money should attenuate the underestimation-of-compliance effect 
There are several terms for interactions characterized by the exchange of money 
for services, including a market pricing relationship (Fiske, 1992), a monetary market 
(Heyman & Ariely, 2004), a business decision frame (Kouchaki, Smith-Crowe, Brief, & 
Sousa, 2013), and an economic exchange, schema, or context (Blau, 1986, 1994; 
Molinsky, Grant, & Margolis, 2012; Pillutla & Chen, 1999). Although there are 
noteworthy differences among these classifications, they all agree that requests involving 
money (a) have more objectively defined criteria for determining value, (b) emphasize 
rationality and self-interest over politeness, and (c) are less personal, sentimental, and 
emotionally wrought than requests that do not involve money or involve non-monetary 
incentives. These qualities of monetary exchanges are likely to attenuate requesters’ 
tendency to underestimate compliance by reducing or eliminating the aforementioned 
sources of bias in requesters’ predictions. 
Favor exchanges involve subjective, often tacit, evaluations of the magnitude of a 
request (Blau, 1986, 1994; Flynn, 2003, 2006). And, as has been argued, an actor who is 
concerned with conveying adequate gratitude or consumed by his or her anxiety is likely 
to exaggerate the costs to a target of agreeing to a request, for example, believing that 
asking someone to complete a small survey is a “big deal.” 
The norms of monetary exchanges, however, emphasize “rationality, efficiency, 
and self-interest, concepts at the heart of economics” (Molinksy et al., 2012, p. 28; see 
also Blau, 1986, 1994; Etzioni, 1988; Fiske, 1992; Frank, 1988; Frank, Gilovich & 
Regan, 1993; Kouchaki et al., 2013; Pillutla & Chen, 1999). According to Blau (1994), 
“social exchange engenders diffuse obligations, whereas those in economic exchange are 
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specified” (p. 152-156, as cited in Flynn, 2006).  In economic exchanges, things are given 
a specific monetary value, and market mentalities encourage ascertaining a good or 
service’s true value. Actors are encouraged to plainly specify the value of items and labor 
in order to facilitate the “comparison of many qualitatively and quantitatively diverse 
factors” (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2008, p. 209, as cited in Kouchaki et al., 2013).  
These interaction norms are unlikely to bias requesters’ assessments of the 
instrumental costs of saying “yes” in the same way as the expressions of gratitude that 
characterize a favor request. An actor concerned with rationality, efficiency, and self-
interest (and who believes the other party is concerned with the same) has no reason to 
overstate what he or she is asking. Rather, he or she should be concerned with evaluating 
a request posed as a monetary exchange in an unbiased manner, for example, recognizing 
that completing a small survey is, in fact, a fairly minor task.  
In addition, exchanges involving money tend to be less emotional than those that 
characterize favor exchanges, hence reducing another source of bias.  According to 
Kouchaki and colleagues (2013), within a business decision frame, “individual targets are 
objectified and the social bonds with them weakened” (p. 54). In essence, exchanges 
involving money are less personal than favor requests, a quality that reduces the 
threatening nature of both the act of asking and the meaning of rejection: it all becomes 
“just business.” Consider the matter-of-fact, unemotional, take-it-or-leave-it tone that 
exemplifies a typical business proposition. By reducing the self-consciousness, anxiety, 
and dread many requesters feel when making a request, offering money reduces the 
emotional sources of bias reviewed above (e.g., Bohns & Flynn, 2015; Loewenstein & 
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Lerner, 2003; Schwarz, 2000) and should therefore boost requesters’ estimations of 
compliance. 
In sum, requests involving money emphasize rationality, objective valuation, and 
self-interest over politeness, and are less personal, sentimental, and emotionally wrought 
than favor requests. These qualities are likely to attenuate requesters’ tendency to 
underestimate compliance by eliminating the sources of bias that lead requesters to 
overestimate the instrumental costs and/or underestimate the social-emotional benefits to 
targets of saying “yes”.  Based on this rationale, we propose our primary hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. Offering money in exchange for compliance will reduce 
requesters’ tendency to underestimate compliance with their requests. 
It is worth noting that previous research has demonstrated that small monetary 
incentives tend to have little or no effect on actual behavior (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; 
Gneezy, Meier, & Rey-Biel, 2011).  Consequently, any impact offering small amounts of 
money has on requesters’ predictions of compliance is unlikely to be met with changes in 
targets’ ultimate willingness to comply.  We therefore argue that the manipulations in our 
studies will affect requesters’ predictions of compliance, but not actual compliance.  This 
reasoning leads us to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. Offering a small amount of money in exchange for compliance will 
increase requesters’ predictions of compliance, but will have little or no effect on actual 
compliance, hence narrowing the gap between the two. 
Pillutla and Chen (1999) have stated that, “a different set of norms will be evoked 
if an activity is viewed as economic rather than as non-economic” (p. 85), and according 
to Heyman and Ariely, simply “[u]sing monetary payments causes participants to invoke 
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monetary-marketplace frames and norms” (p. 787).  Accordingly, offering monetary 
incentives should evoke for requesters the types of frames and norms that characterize 
monetary exchanges—frames and norms associated with rationality, objective valuation, 
self-interest, and a depersonalization of social relationships. We argue that offering 
money in exchange for compliance will lead requesters to adopt a money-market frame, 
in turn reducing their tendency to underestimate compliance. This reasoning leads us to 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3. The mitigation of the underestimation-of-compliance effect that is 
predicted to occur when requesters offer money in exchange for compliance will result 
from requesters’ adoption of a money-market frame.  
The adoption of a money-market frame should reduce the emotional sources of 
bias (the self-consciousness and anxiety many requesters feel when making a request; 
Bohns & Flynn, 2015; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Schwarz, 2000) and/or normative 
sources of bias (the emphasis on humility and gratitude one is expected to display when 
asking for a favor; Blau, 1986, 1994; Flynn, 2003, 2006) reviewed above.  This means 
requesters should be less likely to overestimate the instrumental costs and underestimate 
the social-emotional benefits of compliance. As a result, reducing these sources of bias 
should attenuate requesters’ tendency to underestimate compliance through one or both 
of these paths. This reasoning leads us to our fourth and final hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 4. Offering a monetary incentive when making a request will reduce 
the sources of bias that otherwise cause requesters to underestimate compliance in one of 
three ways: (a) Monetary incentives will reduce the discomfort of asking, allowing 
requesters to more accurately assess the size of their request; (b) Monetary incentives will 
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reduce the discomfort of asking, allowing requesters to view the predicament of their 
targets more clearly (i.e., by recognizing the discomfort targets’ would avoid by saying 
“yes”); Or, (c) Monetary incentives will reduce concerns with humility and gratitude, 
encouraging requesters to more accurately assess the size of their request. 
Overview of the Current Studies 
We conducted a series of five studies in order to test our four hypotheses. In 
Study 1, participants asked people to fill out a brief questionnaire and estimated the 
likelihood that the people they approached would comply with their requests.  We gave 
half of the participants a small cash incentive to offer the people they approached and 
compared predicted and actual compliance in this “monetary incentive” condition to a 
“no incentive” condition. In order to ensure that our findings generalized to other types of 
requests, in Study 2 we replicated the methodology from Study 1 but had participants ask 
people to vandalize a library book rather than fill out a survey. 
In Studies 3-5, we explored our proposed model to explain the underlying 
mechanism for the predicted attenuation effect. Namely, we tested whether monetary 
incentives lead requesters to adopt a money-market frame, thereby reducing the 
discomfort associated with asking and allowing requesters to more accurately assess the 
size of their request. 
In Studies 3 and 4, we explored the first part of this model by examining whether 
our findings could be explained by requesters’ adoption of a money-market frame. In 
Study 3, we added a non-monetary “Candy Bar Incentive” condition in order to ensure 
that our effects were specific to money.  If our findings do in fact result from the 
theorized activation of a money-market frame, non-monetary incentives, such as candy, 
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should not have the same effect.  In our fourth study, we recruited a larger online sample 
of participants to respond to hypothetical scenarios, which allowed us to pit our proposed 
mechanism—that requesters’ use of money leads them to adopt a money-market frame—
against four plausible competing explanations: power (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; 
Anderson, John & Keltner, 2012), self-efficacy (Vohs et al., 2006, 2008; Zhou, Vohs & 
Baumeister, 2009), lay theories of motivation that overemphasize extrinsic motivation 
(Heath, 1999; Kipnis et al., 1976; Miller & Ratner, 1998; Miller, 1999; Nolan et al., 
2008; Strickland, 1958), and concerns with reciprocity or indebtedness (Gouldner, 1960; 
Greenberg, 1980).1 
In Study 5, we explored the second part of this model and delved further into the  
psychological process underlying the attenuation prediction. We have proposed a number 
of psychological explanations for what thinking of a request within a money-market 
frame (i.e., thinking of a request as “just business”) does to a requester’s experience of 
making a request. In this study, we tested three possible explanations directly: (1) A 
business exchange is less awkward and embarrassing than a favor request; therefore, 
requesters are less consumed by their own emotions and better able to accurately assess 
the magnitude of what they are asking. (2) A business exchange is less awkward and 
embarrassing than a favor request; therefore, requesters are less consumed by their own 
emotions and better able to take the perspective of their targets. (3) Requesters feel less 
obligated to be appreciative and grateful in a business exchange; therefore, they are better 
able to accurately assess the magnitude of what they are asking. Using a second set of 
hypothetical scenarios, we tested each of these possibilities in an online sample of 
participants.  
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Study 1: The Effect of Monetary Incentives on Predicted and Actual Compliance 
with a Request to Complete a Questionnaire 
As an initial test of our primary prediction, we replicated and extended Flynn & 
Lake’s (2008; Study 1) questionnaire study, adding a condition in which we introduced a 
monetary incentive. Participants approached random students on campus and made a 
small request (to fill out a questionnaire) either with no incentive or in exchange for $1.  
Before doing so, they predicted how easy it would be to get other students to agree to 
their request.  We compared participants’ beliefs about their capacity to get others to fill 
out the questionnaire to their actual effectiveness at getting others to do so in both the No 
Incentive and Monetary Incentive conditions. 
Participants 
 Forty-nine “primary” participants (36 Female; 13 Male) were recruited through 
the psychology department participant pool’s research website and paid $10 to solicit 205 
“secondary” participants to fill out a questionnaire.  Sample size was determined by 
approximating for each condition the sample size used by Flynn and Lake (2008; Study 
1; N=23 primary participants) in the original version of this study. Primary participants 
were randomly assigned to one of only two conditions (No Incentive, Monetary 
Incentive).  Secondary participants in the No Incentive condition received no monetary 
remuneration for completing the questionnaire.  Secondary participants in the Monetary 
Incentive condition were paid $1 if they agreed to complete the questionnaire.  One 
primary participant in the No Incentive condition dropped out of the study after reading 
the task instructions (before attempting the task) and was paid $5 to complete only the 
pre-task questionnaire.  We did not include this person’s incomplete data in our analyses.  
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Procedure 
 Upon arrival to the lab, our “primary” participants were given a pre-task 
questionnaire.  In this questionnaire, participants read the complete task instructions 
before answering any questions about the task.  An excerpt from the task instructions, 
with the Monetary Incentive condition instructions bolded and in brackets, is below: 
“In this study, you will ask strangers (in person) to do you a small favor [in 
exchange for $1].  Specifically, you will ask them to fill out a brief 
questionnaire…” 
Participants were allowed to review the questionnaire they would be asking secondary 
participants to complete.  The questionnaire was a single-page, abbreviated version of the 
“Big Five Inventory,” a personality questionnaire consisting of items such as, “I see 
myself as someone who is talkative” (Rammstedt & John, 2007).  Participants were also 
provided the script they were to use when approaching people: 
“Will you do me a favor? [If I give you a dollar, w] [W]ill you fill out this 
questionnaire?” 
Primary participants in the monetary incentive condition were instructed to show 
secondary participants a $1 coin2 when they made this request.  
After learning the complete details of the task (no information was withheld), 
participants in both conditions predicted how effectively they would solicit people to fill 
out the questionnaire by providing a free-response answer to the question, “How many 
people do you think you will have to approach before you get 3 people to agree to fill out 
a questionnaire [in exchange for $1]?”   
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 Participants were then provided the following materials for their task: a clipboard; 
a pen; three blank questionnaires; a tally sheet on which to record the responses of each 
person they approached; a copy of the task instructions.  Participants in the Monetary 
Incentive condition were also provided three $1 coins to give to secondary participants 
who completed the questionnaire.  To avoid multiple participants covering the same areas 
of campus, all primary participants were sent to designated campus locations to complete 
the task.  These locations were distributed equally across conditions.  
Secondary participants who agreed to complete the questionnaire were 
subsequently told that they were part of a study and handed a detailed debriefing form.  
For confidentiality reasons, their completed “Big Five” questionnaires were returned to 
them. If they were in the Monetary Incentive condition, they were also given $1 to keep.   
After getting three people to complete a questionnaire, primary participants 
returned to the lab, where they were thanked, debriefed, and paid.  
Results 
We ran a 2 (Compliance: Predicted vs. Actual) x 2 (Incentive Condition: No 
Incentive vs. Monetary Incentive) mixed-model ANOVA with Compliance as a within-
subjects factor and Incentive Condition as a between-subjects factor. [The correlation 
between predicted and actual compliance was r(48)=.27, p=.07.] There was a main effect 
of Compliance such that participants predicted that they would have to ask more people 
overall (M=8.56, SD=5.33) than they actually had to ask (M=4.27, SD=1.93) in order to 
get three individuals to complete a questionnaire, F(1, 46)=37.48, p<.001, ηp2=.41.  
There was also a significant interaction of Compliance with Incentive Condition, F(1, 
46)=7.15, p=.01.  In the No Incentive condition, participants overestimated the number of 
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people they would need to approach to complete their task by a ratio of M=10.42 
(Predicted) to M=4.25 (Actual), F(1, 23)=25.50, p<.001, ηp2=.53.  However, in the 
Monetary Incentive condition, participants overestimated the number of people they 
would need to approach by a ratio of M=6.71 (Predicted) to M=4.29 (Actual), F(1, 
23)=12.31, p=.002, ηp2=.35 (confidence intervals depicted in Figure 1).   
Further analyses confirmed that although there was no difference in actual 
compliance between the No Incentive (M=4.25, SD=2.23) and Monetary Incentive 
(M=4.29, SD=1.63) groups, F(1, 46)=.005, p=.94, there was a significant difference in 
participants’ predictions of compliance between the No Incentive (M=10.42, SD=6.44) 
and Monetary Incentive (M=6.71, SD=3.07) groups, F(1, 46)=6.48, p=.01, ηp2=.13. 
Additional Analyses. Consistent with previous findings (Flynn & Lake, 2008), 
there were no interactions or main effects of gender (all p-values >.52).  
Summary and Discussion  
As expected, we replicated the findings of Flynn and Lake (2008): Participants 
overestimated the number of individuals they would need to ask to get three people to 
agree to their request to fill out a questionnaire.  However, this effect was moderated by 
whether participants offered a monetary incentive to the people they asked. When 
providing a monetary incentive, participants’ predictions were significantly more 
accurate; they overestimated the number of participants they would need to ask to a lesser 
degree. Despite the fact that requesters’ expectations of compliance increased to become 
more accurate when they offered a small monetary incentive, actual compliance remained 
fixed. 
Study 1 provides initial evidence that the introduction of a monetary incentive 
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attenuates the underestimation-of-influence effect.  We used a task previously used by 
Flynn and Lake (2008) as an example of a prosocial request, which makes this finding 
consistent with work by Miller and Ratner (1998) in which people incorrectly assumed 
others would be more likely to engage in prosocial behavior if they had a monetary 
incentive to do so.  However, our theorizing is not specific to prosocial contexts. To 
demonstrate the generalizability of these findings, Study 2 replicates Study 1 using a very 
different type of request.   
Study 2: The Effect of Monetary Incentives on Predicted and Actual Compliance 
with a Request to Vandalize a Library Book  
In Study 2, we used a task from Bohns et al. (2014) in which participants 
approached students on campus and asked them to vandalize a library book. In the 
original study, secondary participants considered the act of vandalizing a library book to 
be unethical; some targets even expressed their own discomfort with the task, as well as 
concerns about getting in trouble for vandalism.  In the current study, primary 
participants asked secondary participants to commit this act either with no economic 
incentive (as in the original study) or in exchange for $1.  Before doing so, they predicted 
how easy it would be to get other students to commit this act.  We compared participants’ 
beliefs about their capacity to get others to deface a library book to their actual 




Forty-three “primary” participants (32 Female; 11 Male) were recruited through 
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the psychology department participant pool’s recruitment website and paid $10 to solicit 
246 “secondary” participants.  Sample size was determined by approximating for each 
condition the sample size used by Bohns et al. (2014; Study 2; N=25 primary 
participants) in the original version of this study. Primary participants were randomly 
assigned to one of only two conditions (No Incentive, Monetary Incentive).  Secondary 
participants in the No Incentive condition received no monetary remuneration for 
agreeing to vandalize a purported library book. Secondary participants in the Monetary 
Incentive condition were paid $1 if they agreed to vandalize the book.  One primary 
participant in the Monetary Incentive condition dropped out of the study after reading the 
task instructions (before making any requests) and was paid $5 to complete only the pre-
task questionnaire. We did not include this person’s incomplete data in our analyses. Two 
primary participants predicted that they would have to ask fewer than three individuals in 
order to get three individuals to comply with the request, indicating that they did not 
understand the instructions.  These two participants are not included in the reported 
analyses; however, our findings are the same when these participants are included. 
Procedure 
 Upon arrival to the lab, our “primary” participants were given a pre-task 
questionnaire.  In this questionnaire, participants read the complete task instructions 
before answering any questions about the task.  An excerpt from the task instructions, 
with the Monetary Incentive condition instructions bolded and in brackets, is below: 
“In this study, you will ask strangers (in person) to commit a small act of vandalism 
[in exchange for $1].  Specifically, you will ask them to write the word ‘pickle’ on a 
page of a library book…” 
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Participants were also provided the script they were to use when approaching people: 
“Hi, I’m trying to play a prank on someone, but they know my handwriting. [If I 
give you $1, w] [W]ill you just quickly write the word ‘pickle’ on this page of this 
library book?” 
Primary participants in the monetary incentive condition were instructed to show 
secondary participants a $1 coin when they made this request.  
After learning the complete details of the task (again, no information was 
withheld), primary participants in both conditions predicted their ability to convince 
others to vandalize the book by providing a free-response answer to the question, “How 
many people do you think you will have to approach before you get 3 people to agree to 
write the word ‘pickle’ in a library book [in exchange for $1]?”   
 Participants were then provided the following materials for their task: a hard-
cover book with a library reference number taped to the spine (the book was made to look 
identical to library books at the university campus library; see Bohns et al., 2014); a pen; 
a tally sheet on which to record the responses of each person they approached; debriefing 
forms for the secondary participants; a copy of the task instructions.  Participants in the 
Monetary Incentive condition were also provided three $1 coins to give to secondary 
participants who completed the vandalism task.  Once again, participants were sent to 
designated campus locations to complete the task and these locations were distributed 
equally across conditions. 
Secondary participants who agreed to vandalize the fake library book were 
subsequently told that they were part of a study, and were assured that the book was not a 
library book and that they had not in fact done anything wrong.  They were then handed a 
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detailed debriefing sheet.  If they were in the Monetary Incentive condition, they were 
also given $1 to keep.  After getting three people to write “pickle” in pen on separate, 
clean pages of the book, primary participants returned to the lab and were thanked, 
debriefed, and paid.  
Results 
We ran a 2 (Compliance: Predicted vs. Actual) x 2 (Incentive Condition: No 
Incentive vs. Monetary Incentive) mixed-model ANOVA with Compliance as a within-
subjects factor and Incentive Condition as a between-subjects factor. [The correlation 
between predicted and actual compliance was r(42)=.30, p=.051.] As in Study 1, there 
was a main effect of Compliance such that participants predicted that they would have to 
ask more people overall (M=9.23, SD=6.34) than they actually had to ask (M=5.93, 
SD=2.82) in order to get three individuals to comply, F(1, 38)=13.14, p=.001, ηp2=.19.  
There was also a significant interaction of Compliance with Incentive Condition, F(1, 
38)=6.67, p=.01.  This interaction indicates that in the No Incentive condition, 
participants overestimated the number of people they would need to approach to 
complete their task (M=11.45 Predicted, M=5.80 Actual), F(1, 19)=13.21, p=.002, 
ηp2=.41.  However, in the Monetary Incentive condition, participants no longer 
significantly overestimated the number of people they would need to approach (M=7.00 
Predicted, M=6.05 Actual), F(1, 19)=1.01, p=.33, ηp2=.05 (confidence intervals depicted 
in Figure 2). 
As in Study 1, there was no difference in actual compliance between the No 
Incentive (M=5.80, SD=1.94) and Monetary Incentive (M=6.05, SD=3.55) groups, F(1, 
38)=.08, p=.78, but there was a significant difference in participants’ predictions of 
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compliance between the No Incentive (M=11.45, SD=7.96) and Monetary Incentive 
(M=7.00, SD=2.96) groups, F(1, 39)=5.90, p=.02, ηp2=.08. 
Additional Analyses. Consistent with previous findings (Bohns et al., 2014) and 
Study 1, there were no interactions or main effects of gender (all p-values >.47).  
Summary and Discussion  
In Study 2, we replicated the moderating effect of monetary incentives from 
Study 1 using a very different type of request.  This finding suggests that this effect is not 
the result of underestimating others’ prosocial intentions in the absence of economic 
incentives; rather, the effect is more general, arising in different domains due to 
requesters’ basic perceptions of their ability to influence others with and without 
monetary incentives.  
Study 3: Comparing Monetary and Non-Monetary Incentives 
Studies 1 and 2 provide evidence that the underestimation-of-compliance effect is 
attenuated when a monetary incentive is introduced. We have theorized that this finding 
is the result of the activation of a money-market frame. Heyman and Ariely (2004) have 
differentiated between the effects of monetary and non-monetary incentives, such as 
candy.  Only monetary incentives have been shown to activate the kind of frames and 
norms that we have argued are driving our findings in the current studies. By Heyman 
and Ariely’s reasoning, offering candy in exchange for compliance would activate 
“social-exchange” or “social-market” frames and norms, which are more similar to the 
frames and norms that characterize a typical favor exchange.  Accordingly, only 
monetary incentives should activate a money-market frame, and therefore only monetary 
incentives should mitigate the underestimation-of-compliance effect.   
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To determine whether this effect is indeed specific to monetary incentives, which 
would support our proposed mechanism, or whether it would occur with any kind of 
extrinsic incentive, we replicated Study 2 and added a third condition in which primary 
participants asked secondary participants to vandalize a library book in exchange for a 
candy bar. We chose candy as our non-monetary incentive because candy has been 
contrasted with monetary incentives in previous research (Heyman & Ariely, 2004). We 
once again compared participants’ beliefs about their capacity to get others to deface a 
library book to their actual effectiveness at getting others to do so in the No Incentive and 
Monetary Incentive conditions, as well as in the new Candy Bar Incentive condition.    
Methods 
Participants 
 Seventy-six “primary” participants (55 Female; 21 Male) were recruited through 
the psychology department participant pool’s recruitment website and paid $10 to solicit 
401 “secondary” participants.  Sample size was again determined by approximating for 
each condition the sample size used by Bohns et al. (2014; Study 2; N=25 primary 
participants) in the original version of this study. Primary participants were randomly 
assigned to one of only three conditions (No Incentive, Monetary Incentive, Candy Bar 
Incentive).  Secondary participants in the No Incentive condition received no 
remuneration for agreeing to vandalize a purported library book.  Secondary participants 
in the Monetary Incentive condition were paid $1 if they agreed to vandalize the book.  
Secondary participants in the Candy Bar Incentive condition received a Snickers© 
chocolate bar (worth approximately $1.25 locally) for agreeing to vandalize the book.  
Six primary participants (one in the No Incentive condition, one in the Monetary 
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Incentive condition, and four in the Candy Bar Incentive condition) dropped out of the 
study and were paid $5 to complete only the pre-task questionnaire. We did not include 
these participants’ incomplete data in the analyses. 
Procedure 
 Upon arrival to the lab, our “primary” participants were given a pre-task 
questionnaire.  In this questionnaire, participants read the complete task instructions 
before answering any questions about the task.  An excerpt from the task instructions 
with the Monetary Incentive and Candy Bar Incentive conditions bolded and in brackets 
is below: 
“In this study, you will ask strangers (in person) to commit a small act of vandalism 
[in exchange for $1/in exchange for a Snickers bar].  Specifically, you will ask 
them to write the word ‘pickle’ on a page of a library book…” 
Participants were also provided the script they were to use when approaching people: 
“Hi, I’m trying to play a prank on someone, but they know my handwriting. [If I 
give you $1, w/ If I give you this Snickers bar, w] [W]ill you just quickly write the 
word ‘pickle’ on this page of this library book?” 
Primary participants in the Monetary Incentive and Candy Bar Incentive conditions were 
instructed to show secondary participants a $1 coin or a Snickers bar, respectively, when 
they made this request.  
After learning the complete details of the task (again, no information was 
withheld), primary participants in all three conditions predicted how effectively they 
would persuade people to vandalize the book by providing a free-response answer to the 
question, “How many people do you think you will have to approach before you get 3 
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people to agree to write the word ‘pickle’ in a library book [in exchange for $1/in 
exchange for a Snickers bar]?”   
Participants were then provided the following materials for their task: a hard-
cover book with a library reference number taped to the spine; a pen; a tally sheet on 
which to record the responses of each person they approached; debriefing forms for the 
secondary participants; a copy of the task instructions.  Participants in the Monetary 
Incentive condition were also provided three $1 coins to give to secondary participants 
who completed the vandalism task.  Participants in the Candy Bar Incentive condition 
were provided three Snickers bars to give to secondary participants who completed the 
vandalism task.  Participants were again sent to designated campus locations, which were 
distributed equally across conditions, to complete the task3.  Participants were debriefed 
as in the previous study, and, once again, secondary participants who agreed to vandalize 
the book were allowed to keep their incentive (the $1 or the Snickers bar).   
Results 
We ran a 2 (Compliance: Predicted, Actual) x 3 (Incentive Condition: No 
Incentive, Monetary Incentive, Candy Bar Incentive) mixed-model ANOVA with 
Compliance as a within-subjects factor and Incentive Condition as a between-subjects 
factor.  [The correlation between predicted and actual compliance was r(70)=.09, p=.46.] 
As in Studies 1 and 2, there was a main effect of Compliance such that participants 
predicted that they would have to ask more people overall (M=11.27, SD=7.64) than they 
actually had to ask (M=5.73, SD=2.03) to complete the task of getting three individuals to 
comply, F(1, 67)=38.89, p<.001, ηp2=.37.  However, this main effect was once again 
qualified by an interaction of Compliance with Incentive Condition, F(2, 67)=3.83, 
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p=.03.  This interaction indicates that, excluding the Candy Bar Incentive condition, we 
replicated the interaction of the Monetary Incentive versus No Incentive condition on the 
accuracy of participants’ predictions, F(1, 47)=4.20, p=.05.  In the No Incentive 
condition, participants overestimated the number of people they would need to approach 
to complete their task (M=11.58 Predicted, M=5.54 Actual), F(1, 23)=14.12, p=.001, 
ηp2=.38.  In the Monetary Incentive condition, participants also overestimated the number 
of people they would need to approach (M=8.24 Predicted, M=5.92 Actual), F(1, 
24)=6.85, p=.02, ηp2=.22, but to a lesser degree.  However, the interaction between the 
No Incentive condition and the Candy Bar Incentive condition was not significant, F(1, 
43)=.75, p=.39.  In fact, participants in the Candy Bar Incentive condition overestimated 
the number of people they would need to approach to a slightly greater degree than did 
participants in either of the other two conditions (M=14.00 Predicted, M=5.71 Actual), 
F(1, 20)=16.07, p=.001, ηp2=.45 (confidence intervals depicted in Figure 3). 
As in Studies 1 and 2, there was no difference in actual compliance across the 
three groups (No Incentive M=5.54, SD=2.11; Monetary Incentive M=5.92, SD=2.16; 
Candy Bar Incentive M= 5.71, SD=1.85), F(2, 67)=.21, p=.81.  However, there was a 
significant difference in participants’ predictions of compliance, F(2, 72)=3.43, p=.04, 
ηp2=.087.  Participants in the Monetary Incentive condition thought they would be more 
effective (i.e., would need to ask fewer people to reach their goal; M=8.24, SD=3.78) 
than those in the No Incentive condition (M=11.58, SD=8.15), F(1, 48)=3.45, p=.07, 
ηp2=.067.  However, participants’ predictions in the Candy Bar condition (M=14.00, 
SD=9.40) did not differ from those in the No Incentive condition, F(1, 43)=.85, p=.36. 
(Participants’ predictions did differ significantly between the Monetary Incentive 
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condition and the Candy Bar Incentive condition, F[1, 44]=7.89, p=.007, ηp2=.15.)  
Additional Analyses. Consistent with previous findings and Studies 1 and 2, 
there were no interactions or main effects of gender (all p-values >.44).  
Summary and Discussion  
For a third time, we demonstrated moderation by monetary incentives.  When 
primary participants offered a monetary incentive to secondary participants, they 
underestimated compliance to a lesser degree.  Further, in support of our proposed 
mechanism, this effect appears to be specific to monetary incentives.  When primary 
participants offered a non-monetary (candy) incentive equivalent in value to the monetary 
incentive, their predictions were statistically equivalent to those in the no incentive 
condition, even trending in the opposite direction (towards predicting even lower levels 
of compliance).  In other words, offering non-monetary incentives to another person in 
exchange for their compliance did not influence participants’ predictions; however, 
offering money specifically did.   
Study 4: A Scenario Study to Test  
Four Alternative Mechanisms for the Attenuation Effect 
Thus far, we have found support for our primary hypothesis (i.e., that monetary 
incentives attenuate the underestimation of compliance) in three behavioral studies in 
which a total of 167 primary participants made actual requests of 852 secondary 
participants.  We have argued that this effect is the result of the activation of a money-
market frame and have found initial support for this proposed mechanism in our third 
study in which we found that money, but not non-monetary incentives, attenuated the 
underestimation-of-compliance effect. 
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One specific type of money-market frame that money has been shown to evoke is 
a business decision frame (Tenbrusel & Messick, 1999), which, in addition to sharing 
many features with other money-market frames, is uniquely characterized by the 
depersonalization of social relationships and has been found to mediate the association 
between money primes and unethical outcomes (Kouchaki et al., 2013).  Adapting 
Kouchaki and colleagues’ mechanistic use of a business decision frame to the favor 
exchange contexts (Flynn, 2003, 2006) we focus on in the current research, we 
operationalized the money-market frame activated by monetary incentives in the current 
study as the adoption of a business exchange orientation—an orientation characterized by 
rationality, self-interest, objective valuation, and a depersonalization of social 
relationships.  In this study, we predict that offering money in exchange for compliance 
will lead requesters to adopt a business exchange orientation, in turn reducing their 
tendency to underestimate compliance. 
We recruited approximately four times as many participants per condition 
compared to our previous studies in order to test this proposed mechanism (the adoption 
of a money-market frame operationalized as a business exchange orientation) against four 
alternative mechanisms using a vignette paradigm.  In particular, we tested this proposed 
mechanism against the following alternative possibilities: (1) power (Anderson & 
Galinsky, 2006; Anderson, John & Keltner, 2012), (2) self-efficacy (Vohs et al., 2006, 
2008; Zhou et al., 2009), (3) lay theories of motivation that overemphasize extrinsic 
incentives (Heath, 1999; Miller, 1999; Miller & Ratner, 1998), and (4) concerns with 
reciprocity or indebtedness (Gouldner, 1960; Greenberg, 1980).  Each of these alternative 
explanations and the measures used to test them is described below. 
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Method 
Participants 
 Two-hundred eighty-one participants (178 Male; 103 Female; MAge=35.5) were 
recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants completed the study online and 
were randomly assigned to condition using Qualtrics.     
Procedure 
 Participants were assigned to one of only three conditions (Monetary Incentive, 
No Incentive, Candy Bar Incentive).  All participants read only two scenarios within their 
condition.  After each scenario, they answered only the scales listed below related to each 
scenario.  First, each participant was presented with all six scales constructed to test our 
competing mechanisms (business exchange orientation, power, self-efficacy, lay theories 
of extrinsic motivation, reciprocity) plus one control variable (communal orientation) in 
randomized order.  After these questions relating to our mechanisms, participants were 
presented with our primary DV (likelihood of compliance). 
 Scenarios. We created two scenarios in which participants were asked to imagine 
making the two requests from Studies 1-3 (completing a questionnaire and vandalizing a 
library book) of other people.  There were three versions of each scenario—in one 
version, participants imagined making each request with no mention of money, and in the 
other versions participants imagined offering the other person either $1 or a candy bar, as 
they did in the behavioral studies.  All participants read two scenarios within their 
assigned incentive condition (Monetary Incentive, No Incentive, or Candy Bar Incentive).  
The scenarios were presented randomly to control for order effects.  Both scenarios, with 
the wording for the Monetary and Candy Bar incentive conditions bolded and in brackets, 
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are below: 
Questionnaire Scenario. Imagine that you are doing survey research on 
university students. You just need one more student to fill out a 
questionnaire for you. The questionnaire is brief—only about 2 pages 
long. [You have a dollar/candy bar to give each student who agrees to 
fill out the questionnaire.]  You go up to a student on campus [with a 
dollar/candy bar in your hand] and ask, "Will you fill out this 
questionnaire [for $1/a candy bar]?" 
 
Vandalism Scenario. Imagine that you want to pull a prank on your friend. 
You come up with a plan to write the word “pickle” (an inside joke) in a 
library book your friend borrowed from your university library, which 
might get your friend in trouble when the book is returned. Since your 
friend knows your handwriting, you can't write in the book yourself. You 
look around and see a stranger sitting nearby.  [You have a dollar/candy 
bar, so y/] [Y]ou go up to the stranger with a pen [and the dollar/candy 
bar] and say, "I'm playing a prank on my friend.  Would you write the 
word 'pickle' in this library book for me [if I give you $1/this candy 
bar]?" 
Business Exchange Orientation Measure 
Our primary proposed mechanism is that money activates a money-market frame.  
In the current study, we operationalized this frame as a business exchange orientation 
using a set of items adapted from Aggarwal & Larrick (2012).  Aggarwal and Larrick had 
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participants identify corporate brands as either communal- or exchange-oriented using 
four items that capture the emphasis on self-interest—what each person expects to get out 
of the exchange—and depersonalization—it’s “just business”— that typify a business 
exchange orientation (cf., Kouchaki et al., 2013; Tenbrusel & Messick, 1999).  
Specifically, as a measure of “exchange orientation,” Aggarwal and Larrick asked 
participants to indicate the extent to which each brand was: (1) like a businessperson, and 
(2) concerned about making money from them.  We adapted these two items for the 
purposes of our study to be specific to a request context.  Because two of our three 
incentive conditions did not involve money, we also removed the explicit mention of 
money as the unit of exchange. In the end, the two items we used to measure business 
exchange orientation were: “To what extent does this situation feel like a business 
transaction?” and “To what extent do you think the other person is concerned with getting 
something from you in this situation?”  These two items, along with all other items for 
our competing mechanisms, were captured on a 7-point scale ranging from “1=Not at all” 
to “7=To a great extent.”  The Cronbach’s alpha for these two items was .64. We note 
that this alpha level is fairly low. In the context of the current results, this shortcoming 
ultimately makes our results more conservative; however, it may be worth fine-tuning 
this measurement for future research.   
In their study, Aggarwal and Larrick also asked participants to indicate the extent 
to which the corporate brands in their study were (a) concerned about their needs, and (b) 
like a family member, as a measure of how communal-oriented participants perceived 
these brands to be. To be consistent with Aggarwal and Larrick, we also adapted these 
two items and used them as a control. Specifically, we included two measures of 
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communal orientation in our study: “To what extent is the other person concerned about 
your needs in this situation?” and “To what extent does this situation feel like interacting 
with a close friend or family member?” The Cronbach’s alpha for these two items was 
.79.  
Alternative Explanations and Measures 
Power.  One alternative explanation for our observed pattern of results is that 
using money in an attempt to influence someone else increases one’s sense of power, 
which in turn makes one more confident that one’s requests will be granted.  According 
to Keltner, Gruenfeld and Anderson (2003), power refers to the extent to which a person 
can “modify others’ states by providing or withholding resources” (p. 265).  This 
definition could potentially apply to the monetary-incentive condition described in the 
current research. Further, a heightened sense of power has been linked to optimism 
(Anderson & Galinsky, 2006), an exaggerated sense of control over desired outcomes 
(Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009), and overconfident decision-making 
(Fast, Sivanathan, Mayer, & Galinsky, 2012), all of which could be related to requesters’ 
increased confidence in their ability to influence targets.  
To test this possibility, we used the sense of power scale developed by Anderson 
& Galinsky (2006).  This scale contains eight items that measure a person’s sense of 
power, such as “I can get him/her/them to listen to what I say,” and “My wishes do not 
carry much weight.”  According to Anderson, John & Keltner (2012), the sense of power 
scale is typically used to assess a person’s sense of power in a particular situation using 
instructions at the beginning of the scale indicating the interaction or relationship of 
interest, such as, “In this negotiation…” or “In my relationship with my friend…” (p. 
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344). (See Cesario and McDonald [2013] for a more extensive discussion of the context-
specific nature of power.) In this case, we used the phrase “In this interaction…” to 
precede each of the sense of power items. The Cronbach’s alpha for these eight items was 
.89. 
Self-Efficacy. In contrast to the situation-specific nature of power, another 
possible explanation for our results is that thinking about using money makes people feel 
more generally self-efficacious, outside of any specific interpersonal context.  This 
increased sense of self-efficacy, in turn, would have increased our participants’ beliefs 
that their requests would be granted.  Research on the psychology of money has shown 
that simply activating the concept of money through a variety of methods can lead to a 
generalized sense of self-sufficiency, efficaciousness, and confidence, which has 
important consequences across a variety of contexts, ranging from choosing to work 
alone to displaying greater endurance of physical pain (Vohs et al., 2006, 2008; Zhou et 
al., 2009).  According to Zhou et al. (2009), “Money provides a feeling of confidence that 
problems can be solved and needs can be met,” and may therefore be “a social resource 
in which resides efficacious power to manipulate the social system for one's benefit” (p. 
700).  Such “efficacious power” could presumably also boost requesters’ confidence in 
their ability to influence targets. 
To test this possibility, we used a general self-efficacy scale developed by Chen, 
Gully, and Eden (2001).  This is an eight-item scale that includes items such as, “I will be 
able to achieve most of the goals that I have set for myself,” and “When facing difficult 
tasks, I am certain that I will accomplish them.”  In contrast to the sense of power scale 
(Anderson & Galinsky, 2006) and other task-specific self-efficacy scales (Bandura, 
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2006), this scale specifies no particular context to which the items are intended to apply.  
The Cronbach’s alpha for these eight items was .96. 
Lay theories of motivation. Another alternative explanation is that people have 
lay theories of others’ motivation that over-emphasize the importance of extrinsic 
rewards as determinants of others’ behavior. In general, people tend to think that others 
are more driven by extrinsic incentives than they actually are (Heath, 1999; Kipnis et al., 
1976; Miller & Ratner, 1998; Nolan et al., 2008; Strickland, 1958). Miller (1999), in 
particular, has argued that people hold lay theories of others’ behavior that 
overemphasize the role of self-interest.  Relatedly, people have been shown to overweight 
the role of extrinsic rewards when explaining others’ behavior. For example, in a series of 
survey studies by Heath (1999), participants mistakenly expected their peers’ career 
choices to be motivated primarily by pay and other extrinsic incentives (e.g., title, job 
security).   
This mechanism would likely apply to candy as well as money, so based on our 
findings in Study 3, this particular explanation seems unlikely.  However, to confirm, we 
included a measure of extrinsic incentives in our study. We used Heath’s (1999) 
definition of extrinsic incentives to create a four-item, face-valid index to assess the 
extent to which participants assumed the other person’s behavior in the scenarios would 
depend on the extrinsic rewards associated with complying or not complying with each 
request.  Note that we could not use Heath’s actual items, which were originally adapted 
from Nadler and Lawler (1989), because these items were highly specific to the questions 
he was studying (e.g., “How important [to you] is…the amount of pay you get [in your 
job]?”).  
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The items we created were: “To what extent do you think the other person would 
say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to your request because of the costs and benefits to them?”; “To what 
extent do you think the other person would say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to your request based on 
what they might gain or lose in this situation?”; “To what extent do you think the other 
person would say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to your request based on the risks they might incur or the 
rewards they might reap in this situation?”; “To what extent do you think the other person 
would say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to your request because of what’s in it for them?” The 
Cronbach’s alpha for these four items was .90.   
Reciprocity. A final possibility is that offering money in exchange for 
compliance with a request makes a requester feel less indebted to his or her target.  Part 
of what makes the act of asking a stranger for something so awkward is the sense that we 
are violating a norm of reciprocity—the informal agreement that if you do something for 
me now, I’ll do something for you later (Gouldner, 1960; Greenberg, 1980).  Being 
indebted to or “owing” someone else is extremely uncomfortable, yet it is difficult to 
reciprocate someone’s compliance if we have no ongoing relationship with that person.  
Offering another person a clear incentive to comply solves this problem, allowing a 
requester to evade this uncomfortable feeling of irresolvable indebtedness, which could 
make requesters feel more confident when making a request.  
As with the aforementioned extrinsic incentives mechanism, this mechanism 
would likely apply to candy as well as money, so based on our findings in Study 3, this 
explanation seems unlikely.  However, to confirm, we also included items asking how 
indebted requesters would feel if targets were to comply. Three items were adapted from 
Tsang (2006) and Watkins et al. (2006).  Specifically, participants were asked to indicate 
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how indebted they would feel if the target were to comply with their request, how 
obligated to reciprocate they would feel, and how much they would feel like they owed 
the target. The Cronbach’s alpha for these three items was .95. 
Dependent Measure 
Likelihood of Compliance. Our primary dependent variable measured 
participants’ expectations of compliance with a single question specific to each scenario: 
“How likely is it that the person you approach would agree to [write in the book/fill out 
the questionnaire]?”  Responses were captured on a 7-point scale ranging from “1=Not at 
all” to “7=Extremely.”  Because no differences were found in actual compliance in 
Studies 1-3, and the scenarios created for Study 4 were identical to the requests used in 
these previous studies, we considered this measure of predicted compliance alone to be 
sufficient for testing our five competing mechanisms.   
Additional Measures 
Demographic Questions. At the end of the survey, participants were asked their 
gender and age. 
Results 
 Main Effects Analyses. A 3(Incentive Condition: No Incentive, Monetary 
Incentive, Candy Bar Incentive) x 2(Individual Scenarios) Mixed Model ANOVA with 
“likelihood of compliance” as our dependent variable revealed our predicted main effect 
of condition, F(2, 278)=9.88, p<.001, ηp2=.07 (there was no interaction of scenario, 
p>.21).  Participants in the Monetary Incentive condition (M=4.70, SD=1.15) thought the 
people they asked would be more likely to comply with their requests than those in the 
No Incentive condition, (M=3.85, SD=1.56), F(1, 186)=18.38, p<.001, ηp2=.09, and those 
 Money and Compliance 36 
in the Candy Bar Incentive condition, (M=4.24, SD=1.21), F(1, 188)=7.10, p=.008, 
ηp2=.04.  
The same analyses were conducted for each of our five mechanism variables 
(business exchange orientation, power, self-efficacy, extrinsic motivation, and 
reciprocity). A significant effect of Incentive Condition emerged for only two of our five 
scales: business exchange orientation (F[2, 278]=24.37, p<.001, ηp2=.15) and extrinsic 
motivation (F([2, 278]=5.26, p=.006, ηp2=.04).  There were no significant differences by 
condition on our power (p>.90), self-efficacy (p>.75), or indebtedness (p>.61) scales. 
Mirroring our findings on predicted compliance, participants in the Monetary 
Incentive condition (M=5.07, SD=1.17) adopted more of a business exchange orientation 
than participants in the No Incentive condition (M=3.81, SD=1.33), F(1, 186)=48.15, 
p<.001, ηp2=.21, and participants in the Candy Bar Incentive condition (M=4.62, 
SD=1.27), F(1, 188)=6.53, p=.011, ηp2=.03. 
Participants in the Monetary Incentive condition also thought that their targets 
would be more motivated by extrinsic incentives than participants in the No Incentive 
condition (M=4.29, SD=1.38), F(1, 186)=8.22, p=.005, ηp2=.04.  However, there was no 
significant difference between the Monetary Incentive and Candy Bar Incentive 
conditions on expectations of extrinsic motivation (p>.60).   
 Mediation Analyses. We first conducted a separate mediation analysis for each 
mediator using the PROCESS macro for SPSS with incentive condition as our IV, 
likelihood of compliance as our DV, and each of our five mechanism scales (business 
exchange orientation, power, self-efficacy, extrinsic motivation, and reciprocity) as our 
potential mediators (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).  Because incentive condition is a 
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multicategorical IV, dummy codes for the No Incentive versus Monetary Incentive (D1) 
and No Incentive versus Candy Incentive conditions (D2) were included as predictors 
(making the No Incentive condition the reference group; Hayes & Preacher, 2014).  In 
these analyses, the only 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals that did not include zero 
were the indirect effect of business exchange orientation and extrinsic motivation; the 
95% confidence intervals for the remaining three scales all included zero (see Table 1). 
We subsequently conducted a multiple mediator analysis with these latter two mediators 
(controlling for the remaining three mediators as covariates in the analysis) and found 
that when both potential mediators were entered into the analysis, only the 95% bias-
corrected confidence interval for business exchange did not include zero (see Table 2).  
In other words, mediation was confirmed for business exchange frame, but not for 
extrinsic motivation. All of these results remained unchanged when also controlling for 
communal orientation.   
Additional Analyses. Consistent with previous findings (Bohns et al., 2014; 
Flynn & Lake, 2008) and Studies 1, 2, and 3, there were no interactions or main effects of 
gender (all p-values >.32).  
Separate analyses, including mediation analyses were conducted for both the 
questionnaire and vandalism scenarios separately. The results are identical to the 
combined results presented here. These additional analyses, including mediation results, 
are available in Appendix B.  
Summary and Discussion 
 In our fourth study, we found support for our prediction that participants would 
report higher levels of expected compliance in the Monetary Incentive condition than in 
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the No Incentive condition, despite the fact that no difference in actual compliance was 
found between these conditions in Studies 1-3.  In addition, we once again tested a Candy 
Bar Incentive condition, as we did in Study 3, and found that monetary incentives had a 
greater effect than non-monetary incentives on requesters’ predictions of compliance.  
Further, we used bootstrapping mediation analysis to test our proposed mechanism, the 
activation of a money-market frame, against four competing mechanisms (power, self-
efficacy, extrinsic motivation, and reciprocity), and found that only the activation of a 
money-market frame (specifically, a business exchange orientation) explained our 
findings. 
 Notably, the Candy Bar Incentive condition, while significantly different from the 
Monetary Incentive condition, did not replicate our findings from Study 3 in which 
requesters’ predictions of compliance in the candy bar incentive condition were 
statistically equivalent to those in the no incentive condition. This may be an artifact of 
the study having been online. In Study 3, participants actually held candy bars in their 
hands and gave them out to targets, which likely did not feel very “businesslike.” In 
Study 4, participants simply imagined providing individuals with a candy bar as an 
incentive to comply with a request. In this context, the “exchange” nature of the 
transaction may have been more salient than the exact nature of what was being 
exchanged, since participants were not in fact interacting with the item. For these reasons, 
we have more confidence in our Study 3 findings. However, this inconsistency does 
make the role of candy in this phenomenon less clear and opens up some alternative 
explanations for our findings, which we discuss in more detail in the General Discussion.  
It may be possible that in some cases, non-monetary incentives such as candy may, 
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similar to money, make an interaction feel more like it is “just business.” That said, it 
seems clear that money is more reliable and effective at evoking this kind of frame. 
 Study 4 provides further evidence for our primary hypothesis about the effect of 
money in attenuating the underestimation-of-compliance effect. Further, this study 
provides additional evidence for the role of the activation of a business exchange 
orientation in explaining the effect of money on predicted compliance.     
Study 5: A Scenario Study to Test the Underlying Psychological Mechanism for the 
Attenuation Effect 
In Studies 1 and 2, we provided evidence for an attenuation of the 
underestimation-of-compliance effect when requesters offered money in exchange for 
compliance. In Studies 3 and 4, we provided evidence that this attenuation effect is driven 
by the extent to which a requester thinks of making a request as “just business,” a thought 
process that is strongly—though perhaps not exclusively—activated by offering money in 
exchange for compliance.  In our fifth and final study, we explore the underlying 
psychological explanation for this effect. Specifically, we test which of three 
psychological explanations reviewed in the introduction contribute to requesters’ more 
accurate predictions when offering money. The three possible pathways we tested are: (1) 
A business exchange is less awkward and embarrassing than a favor request; therefore, 
requesters are less consumed by their own emotions and better able to accurately assess 
the magnitude of what they are asking. (2) A business exchange is less awkward and 
embarrassing than a favor request; therefore, requesters are less consumed by their own 
emotions and better able to take the perspective of their targets. (3) Requesters feel less 
obligated to be appreciative and grateful in a business exchange; therefore, they are better 
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able to accurately assess the magnitude of what they are asking. 
To test these possibilities, we recruited a sample of online participants and had 
them imagine making requests of different people either with or without offering 
monetary incentives. A secondary goal of Study 5 was to induce a money-market frame 
without specifying a particular monetary amount to ensure that our findings are the result 
of adopting this framework more generally, rather than being the artifact of a particular 
dollar amount. Thus, in each scenario, participants imagined either that they were to 
simply “pay someone” for their compliance with a request or that they were to make the 
request as a favor. A third and final goal of Study 5 was to extend our findings beyond 
the two favor requests we have used thus far in Studies 1-4. Thus, in Study 5, we used 
four new favor requests, which we pilot tested in order to ensure that they shared the 
same properties as the requests used in Studies 1-4—namely, that targets of these 
requests were just as likely to agree to these requests for free as for pay. 
Method 
Participants 
 One-hundred participants (43 Male; 57 Female; MAge=35.4) were recruited 
through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants completed the study online and were 
randomly assigned to condition using Qualtrics.     
Procedure 
 Participants were assigned to one of only two conditions (No Incentive, Monetary 
Incentive).  All participants read only four scenarios within their condition.  After each 
scenario, they answered only the scales listed below related to each scenario.  First, each 
participant was randomly presented with all four scales constructed to test our 
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psychological mechanisms (requester’s discomfort, requester’s gratitude, perceived size 
of request, target’s perceived discomfort saying “no”). After completing these four scales, 
all participants were presented with our primary DV (expected likelihood of compliance). 
 Scenarios. We created four scenarios in which participants were asked to imagine 
making requests of other people (moving a couch, walking a dog, getting a ride to the 
airport, and shoveling snow).  There were two versions of each scenario—in one version, 
participants imagined offering to pay the other person to perform the task, and in the 
other version, participants imagined asking the other person to perform the task as a 
favor. All participants read four scenarios within their assigned incentive condition 
(Monetary Incentive, No Incentive).  The four scenarios, with the wording for the 
Monetary and No Incentive conditions bolded and in brackets, are listed below: 
Moving a Couch. Imagine that you were to [offer to pay someone/ask 
someone as a favor] to move a couch into your apartment. 
Walking a Dog. Imagine that you were to [offer to pay someone/ask 
someone as a favor] to walk your dog one afternoon.  
Ride to the Airport. Imagine that you were to [offer to pay someone/ask 
someone as a favor] for a ride to the airport. 
Shoveling Snow. Imagine that you were to [offer to pay someone/ask 
someone as a favor] to shovel your driveway after a snowstorm. 
These scenarios were developed through pilot testing to ensure that any 
differences requesters predicted in compliance between requests for pay and 
requests for favors did not represent differences in targets’ actual willingness to 
comply.  We recruited 97 pilot participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk (55 
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Female; 42 Male; MAge=34.8) and randomly assigned them to either a Monetary 
Incentive or a No Incentive request condition. In the Monetary Incentive 
condition, participants rated how likely (on a Likert scale of 1=Not at all to 
7=Extremely) they would be to agree to each request for pay (e.g., “Imagine that 
someone were to offer to pay you to move a couch into their apartment. How 
likely is it that you would agree to move this person’s couch?”). In the No 
Incentive condition, participants rated how likely they would be to agree to 
perform each request as a favor (e.g., “Imagine that someone were to ask you, as a 
favor, to move a couch into their apartment. How likely is it that you would agree 
to move this person’s couch?”). When participants imagined these requests from 
the perspective of the target, they reported that they would be equally likely to 
agree to each request for free (M=4.79, SD=1.29) as they would be to agree for 
pay (M=4.87, SD=1.30), F(1, 95)=.086, p=.77, ηp2=.001. This pattern of results 
did not differ by scenario p>.89. Thus, as in Studies 1-4, any increase in 
requesters’ predictions of compliance in exchange for pay reflects attenuation of a 
social prediction error, not increases in actual compliance.    
Psychological Mechanism Measures. We have theorized that requesters achieve 
greater accuracy when making requests using money because a money-market frame 
increases requesters’ predictions of compliance in one of three ways: (1) Monetary 
incentives reduce the discomfort of asking, allowing requesters to more accurately assess 
the size of their request; (2) Monetary incentives reduce the discomfort of asking, 
allowing requesters to view the predicament of their targets more clearly (i.e., by 
recognizing the discomfort targets seek to avoid by complying); Or, (3) Monetary 
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incentives reduce concerns with humility and gratitude, encouraging requesters to more 
accurately assess the size of their request. 
To test these three possibilities, we created four scales to measure requesters’ 
discomfort, requesters’ perceptions of the size of their request, requesters’ concerns with 
being grateful, and requesters’ perceptions of the discomfort targets would experience 
were they to say “no.” 
Requesters’ Discomfort. We adapted items used by Bohns and Flynn (2010) in 
order to measure requesters’ own discomfort with making these requests. Specifically, we 
asked Ps to indicate how “comfortable” (reverse-scored), “awkward,” and “nervous” they 
would feel making each of these requests on 7-point Likert scales (1=Not at all; 
7=Extremely; alpha=.92). 
Requesters’ Gratitude. To measure requesters’ concern with gratitude, theorized 
by Blau (1986), we asked participants how “grateful,” “appreciative,” and “indebted” 
they would feel towards the other person if they agreed to each request on 7-point Likert 
scales (1=Not at all; 7=Extremely; alpha=.77). 
Perceived Size of the Request. To measure requesters’ perceptions of the size of 
each request, we created three items that Ps answered on 7-point Likert scales (1=Not at 
all; 7=Extremely; alpha=.91): “How ‘big of a deal’ is the thing you are asking this person 
to do?” “How significant of an imposition is this request?” “To what extent is this a 
pretty minor request?” (reverse scored). 
Target’s Perceived Discomfort Saying “No.” Adapting work by Flynn and Lake 
(2008) and Bohns et al. (2011), we used three items to measure requesters’ perceptions of 
how uncomfortable targets would feel saying “no” to their requests. We asked Ps to 
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indicate how “easy” it would be for targets to say “no” to this request (reversed scored) 
and how “comfortable” (reverse scored) and “awkward” they would feel saying “no” on a 
7-point Likert scale (1=Not at all; 7=Extremely; alpha=.85). 
Dependent Variable. Finally, participants indicated for each scenario 
how likely the other person would be to comply on a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 7 
(Extremely): “How likely is it that someone would agree to [move your 
couch/give you a ride to the airport/walk your dog/shovel your driveway]?” 
Results 
 Main Effects Analyses. A 2(Incentive Condition: No Incentive, Monetary 
Incentive) x 4(Individual Scenarios) Mixed Model ANOVA with “likelihood of 
compliance” as our dependent variable revealed our predicted main effect of condition, 
F(1, 98)=3.22, p=.01, ηp2=.06. Participants in the Monetary Incentive condition (M=5.00, 
SD=0.93) thought the people they asked would be more likely to comply with their 
requests than those in the No Incentive condition (M=4.54, SD=0.86) 4. 
The same analyses were conducted for each of our four psychological mechanism 
variables (requesters’ discomfort, requesters’ gratitude, perceived size of request, and 
target’s perceived discomfort saying “no”). There was no significant difference on 
perceptions of targets’ discomfort saying “no” (p>.68). However, there were significant 
differences on the remaining three scales. Participants said they would feel less 
comfortable making these requests in the absence of money (M=4.34, SD=1.24) than if 
they were to pay someone (M=3.63, SD=1.15), F(1, 98)=8.88, p=.004, ηp2=.08.  
Participants also said they would be more appreciative and grateful when asking in the 
absence of money (M=5.93, SD=0.81) as compared to when offering payment (M=5.37, 
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SD=0.87), F(1, 98)=10.85, p=.001, ηp2=.10. Finally, participants indicted that the task 
they were asking someone to do was larger when asking in the absence of money 
(M=4.56, SD=1.01) than when offering payment (M=4.01, SD=0.86), F(1, 98)=8.65, 
p=.004, ηp2=.08.  
Mediation Analyses. We conducted a separate mediation analysis for each 
mediator using the PROCESS macro for SPSS with incentive condition as our IV, 
likelihood of compliance as our DV, and each of our four psychological mechanism 
scales (requesters’ discomfort, requesters’ gratitude, perceived size of request, and 
perceptions of targets’ discomfort saying “no”) as our potential mediators (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2008).  In these analyses, the only 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals that 
did not include zero were the indirect effect of requesters’ discomfort and perceived size 
of the request; the 95% confidence intervals for the two remaining scales both included 
zero (see Table 3).  
This pattern of results is consistent with our first proposed psychological 
explanation—namely, the hypothesis that money reduces requesters’ discomfort, which 
allows requesters to more accurately assess the true size of their request. To further test 
this explanation, we conducted a sequential mediation analysis using Model 6 in the 
PROCESS macro for SPSS. In this analysis, we included incentive condition as our IV, 
likelihood of compliance as our DV, and requesters’ discomfort and perceived size of the 
request as mediators (controlling for requesters’ gratitude and perceived discomfort 
saying “no” by including them as covariates in the model). While the predicted sequential 
mediation was not significant at the 5% level, it was significant at the 10% level: The 
90% confidence interval for the indirect effect of incentive condition on predicted 
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likelihood of compliance, mediated sequentially through requesters’ discomfort and 
perceived size of the request, did not contain zero ([0.0006, 0.0712]). In addition, the 
90% confidence interval for the indirect effect of requesters’ discomfort alone similarly 
did not include zero ([0.0194, 0.3397]; see Table 4).  
Additional Analyses. Consistent with previous findings (Bohns et al., 2014; 
Flynn & Lake, 2008) and Studies 1-4 there were no interactions or main effects of gender 
(all p-values >.53).  
Summary and Discussion 
We found evidence for our first proposed psychological explanation for the 
attenuation effect. Specifically, we found that monetary incentives reduce the discomfort 
of asking, allowing requesters to more accurately assess the size of their request. Viewing 
these requests more objectively – as not such “big deals” – boosts requesters’ predictions 
of compliance, ultimately making them more accurate about the likelihood that others 
will comply with their requests. 
General Discussion 
Asking for a favor can be awkward and uncomfortable.  Requesters are expected 
to convey their appreciation and gratitude, while simultaneously facing the embarrassing 
prospect of rejection.  The current research suggests that by offering their targets money, 
requesters may activate the rational, self-serving frames and norms that characterize 
monetary exchanges, hence mitigating this discomfiting experience.  Viewing a request 
as “just business” makes it less personally and interpersonally threatening and allows a 
requester to make a more cool, calculated assessment of the actual costs and benefits of 
compliance, ultimately recognizing that many ordinary requests are “no big deal.” For 
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these reasons, we find that offering money is likely to mitigate requesters’ documented 
tendency to doubt their ability to get others to comply with their requests (Bohns et al., 
2011; Bohns et al., 2014; Flynn & Lake, 2008; Newark et al., 2014). 
In five studies, we found that requesters thought they would be more effective at 
soliciting compliance with a request when they offered their targets small monetary 
incentives than when they offered no incentives.  This was true despite the fact that these 
monetary incentives had no effect on actual compliance.  Further, we found evidence for 
the underlying mechanism for this effect. Specifically, we found that offering monetary 
incentives activates a money-market frame, which we operationalized as a business 
exchange orientation; this activation, in turn, reduced the sources of bias that cause 
requesters to exaggerate what they are asking for – and therefore the likelihood of 
rejection – in the absence of money.  
Practical and Theoretical Contributions 
Our findings suggest that although people tend to be unaware of their influence 
over others through social-emotional means, they seem to be more aware of their 
influence over others when offering monetary incentives.  However, if people attribute 
their influence to the money they are offering, they may erroneously think monetary 
means of influence are superior to social-emotional means. In other words, people may 
believe it is more effective to offer another person money in exchange for their 
compliance when, in fact, others may be quite willing to do things for free. At the end of 
the day, offering money helps us avoid belief in rejection more than it helps us avoid 
rejection itself. 
Our findings replicate and extend previous research on the underestimation-of-
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compliance effect (Bohns et al., 2011; Bohns et al., 2014; Flynn & Lake, 2008; Newark 
et al., 2014), identifying an important moderator of this effect. Specifically, introducing 
monetary incentives into the request dynamic appears to mitigate requesters’ undue 
pessimism in their ability to get others to comply with their requests.   
The current research also provides a complementary perspective to work by 
Heyman and Ariely (2004) on the psychology of money. While Heyman and Ariely 
explored the varying effects of different incentive types on individuals who receive them, 
the current research demonstrates that different incentive types can also have varying 
effects on the psychology of those who offer them.  In particular, we find that even small 
amounts of money can affect everyday interpersonal interactions, such as making a 
simple request of another person. Further, our studies provide additional support for the 
“special” nature of money compared to other types of resources like candy (Heyman & 
Ariely, 2004) or time (DeVoe & House, 2012; DeVoe & Pfeffer, 2007, 2010; Pfeffer & 
DeVoe, 2009), although just how unique our effects are to money is not entirely clear 
(see discussion below).  
Limitations and Future Directions 
  We believe these studies provide compelling evidence for the moderation of the 
underestimation-of-compliance effect by monetary incentives, as well as the proposition 
that the introduction of money reframes a favor request into a monetary transaction or 
business exchange.  However, a number of questions remain.  For example, What effects 
might varying the type and magnitude of both incentives and requests have on our 
findings?  Might simple reminders of money similarly attenuate the effect, or is it 
essential for requesters to at least imagine using money as a specific means of influence? 
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Would these same effects occur when making requests of friends or people with whom 
the requester has an ongoing relationship?  These questions are described in more detail 
below and offer fertile ground for future research. 
We noted earlier that the current research provides support for the “special” 
nature of money, since non-monetary incentives did not moderate the attenuation effect 
in Study 3 and was significantly different from money in Study 4. However, the only 
non-monetary incentive we tested in the current studies was candy, an incentive that has 
specifically been associated with “social market” frames and norms (Heyman & Ariely, 
2004). Further, our findings using candy were inconsistent between Studies 3 and 4: 
requesters’ predictions of compliance were statistically equivalent in the Candy and No 
Incentive conditions in Study 3, but requesters’ predicted greater compliance when they 
imagined offering candy in Study 4. An interesting area for future research will be to 
examine just how specific this effect is to money.  As noted earlier, it may be that, in 
some cases, non-monetary incentives such as candy may make an interaction feel more 
businesslike. There may also be other types of non-monetary incentives that, like money, 
do not draw upon “social markets,” and may therefore have effects similar to money. As 
DeVoe and Iyengar (2010) have argued, there are non-monetary incentives that share a 
number of the defining characteristics of money.  For example, research participation 
credit at a university is both a “unit of account (a standard and easily divided numerical 
unit of value),” and a “store of value (reliably saved and retrieved),” while airline points 
are a “medium of exchange (an asset used to purchase goods and services)” (DeVoe & 
Iyengar, 2010, p. 160).  It remains to be seen whether money is truly the only type of 
incentive that would invoke a “business exchange orientation” in these sorts of 
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interactions.   
Further, in monetary markets, “participants’ payments for their labor are based on 
a wage rate that reflects the amount and quality of the work performed” (Heyman & 
Ariely, 2004, p. 788).  Given this emphasis on the proportionality of inputs to outputs 
(Fiske, 1992), both the magnitude of incentives and the size of a request are likely to play 
a larger role in requests made within a money-market framework than a social-market 
framework (DeVoe & Iyengar, 2010; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Heyman & Ariely, 
2004).  Previous research has found differences in predicted compliance, but not actual 
compliance, when varying request size within a favor exchange context (Flynn & Lake, 
2008, Study 6). However, different findings may emerge within the context of a monetary 
market.  It would be interesting to see whether varying the magnitude of the monetary 
incentives and/or the size of the requests to the point where differences in actual 
compliance started to emerge (e.g., offering $1 for the completion of an extremely 
extensive questionnaire, or $20 to write a word in a library book) would reveal a similar 
pattern of results.  Would requesters continue to adjust their predictions of compliance 
more steeply than any changes in actual compliance?    
There may also be request domains for which offering money is considered 
inappropriate.  For example, it is considered taboo by many cultures to exchange money 
for certain types of goods and services (e.g., offering money in exchange for votes or 
organs [Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000]). Targets may similarly take 
offense to being offered a monetary incentive for doing something they feel morally or 
socially obligated to do (or not do). Offering a financial incentive when it may be 
insulting to do so could potentially lower both predicted and actual compliance, but to 
 Money and Compliance 51 
different extents.    
Participants in our studies actually used monetary incentives as a means of 
influence (Studies 1-3), or imagined using monetary incentives as a specific means of 
influence (in Study 4).  However, in a number of ways, our findings mirror work on the 
effects of money primes in which simple reminders of money have been shown to have a 
variety of effects on an individual’s psychological state even when money is not 
specifically used as a medium of exchange.  For example, as discussed earlier, Kouchaki 
and colleagues (2013) found that simply priming the concept of money using methods 
such as a word descrambling task led participants in their studies to adopt a “business 
decision frame,” and the activation of this frame was associated with the enactment of 
unethical behaviors (see also Vohs et al., 2006, 2008; Zhou et al., 2009).  Similarly, 
priming money prior to making a request could make requesters feel more “businesslike,” 
which could potentially reduce their feelings of discomfort and concern with favor 
request mores in our studies.  An interesting area for future research would be to explore 
whether simply priming money would similarly mitigate the underestimation of 
compliance, or whether the act (or thought) of actually offering money to one’s target is 
essential to reducing this prediction error. 
Finally, the current studies involved requests made between strangers, rather than 
individuals in ongoing relationships.  It is highly possible that adding monetary 
incentives to requests made between friends would have different effects, in part because 
it may be less awkward to ask a friend for something than a stranger, and money may 
therefore play a less pronounced role in boosting predicted compliance in these instances.  
Alternatively, non-monetary incentives may behave differently for requests made 
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between friends, since the social exchange norms activated by non-monetary incentives 
such as candy or pizza are more appropriate to close relationships. Similarly, it would be 
interesting to see whether similar effects might occur in ongoing work relationships, 
which may have both social and economic qualities.  For example, would a boss’s 
predictions about how likely her employees would be to work overtime show a similar 
pattern depending on whether she offered overtime pay?  
Conclusion 
 A simple request is an incredibly powerful, although underrated, tool of influence 
that often requires no additional incentive to elicit compliance.  Yet, in the absence of 
monetary incentives, many people feel uncomfortable making requests and doubt their 
effectiveness.  The current research suggests that offering even small monetary incentives 
may mitigate these concerns by reframing an awkward social interaction as a business 
exchange, making people more optimistic—indeed, more realistic—about the possibility 
that their requests will be granted.    
 Money and Compliance 53 
Footnotes 
1We have followed the recommendations of Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn (2011) in 
reporting all of our methods and analyses.  Note that the primary DVs in each of our 
behavioral studies (Studies 1-3) are predicted and actual compliance.  In the primary text, 
we report our full behavioral findings—that is, the effect of all our manipulations on all 
of our primary dependent variables (predicted and actual compliance).  However, we also 
included a small number of exploratory self-report measures in Studies 1-3, which we 
ultimately decided were not essential to our theory. These supplemental measures and our 
complete analyses of them can be found in the appendix.  
 
2Studies 1-3 were conducted in Canada where $1 coins are used instead of $1 bills. 
 
3To address the possibility of repeat secondary participants, primary participants were 
instructed to record any repeats on their tally sheet and move on to another person (i.e., 
repeats did not count as either a “yes” or “no”).  There were no reported repeats in 
Studies 1 or 2, and four reported repeats in Study 3 (two in the no-incentive condition, 
one in the monetary incentive condition, and one in the candy incentive condition).   
 
4 This analysis also revealed an interaction of incentive condition with scenario type F(1, 
96)=3.96, p=.02, which appears to be driven by a single scenario (the “couch” scenario), 
which did not follow the same pattern of results as the other three scenarios on the 
primary DV. Although we report the results in the main text with this scenario included, 
removing this scenario strengthens all of the reported mechanism results, including 
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Figures 
Figure 1.  Participants’ predictions of how many people they would have to approach to 
get three to agree to a request to complete a questionnaire differed in the No Incentive 
and Monetary Incentive conditions, even though actual compliance was the same across 
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Figure 2.  Participants’ predictions of how many people they would have to approach to 
get three to comply with a request to vandalize a library book differed in the No Incentive 
and Monetary Incentive conditions, even though actual compliance was the same across 

















































 Money and Compliance 66 
Figure 3. A monetary incentive decreased participants’ predictions of how many people 
they would have to approach to get three to comply with a request to vandalize a library 
book, but a candy bar incentive did not.  Actual compliance was the same across all three 
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Table 1. Mediation analysis in Study 4 with dummy codes for No Incentive vs. Money 
(D1) and No Incentive vs. Candy (D2) for each mediator individually. 
 
      
Bias Corrected 
95% CI 




SE Lower Upper 
D1  Business Exchange Orientation 0.2757 0.0927 0.0981 0.4632 
D2  Business Exchange Orientation 0.1761 0.0693 0.0601 0.3440 
 
      
 
 
D1  Power 0.0402 0.1070 -0.1910 0.2407 
D2  Power 0.0402 0.1069 -0.1668 0.2630 
 
      
 
 
D1  Self-Efficacy -0.0307 0.0498 -0.1609 0.0501 
D2  Self-Efficacy -0.0328 0.0467 -0.1418 0.0529 
 
      
 
 
D1  Extrinsic Motivation 0.0864 0.0536 0.0109 0.2198 
D2  Extrinsic Motivation 0.1021 0.0589 0.0202 0.2492 
 
      
 
 
D1  Indebtedness -0.0487 0.0517 -0.1678 0.0431 
D2  Indebtedness -0.0216 0.0509 -0.1325 0.0747 








 Money and Compliance 68 
Table 2. Multiple-mediator analysis comparing business exchange frame to extrinsic 
incentives in Study 4 with dummy codes for No Incentive vs. Money (D1) and No 
Incentive vs. Candy (D2).   
 
      
Bias Corrected 
95% CI 




SE Lower Upper 
D1  Business Exchange Orientation 0.1825 0.0796 0.0503 0.3620 
 Extrinsic Motivation 0.0602 0.0456 -0.0029 0.1774 
D2  Business Exchange Orientation 0.1161 0.0565 0.0310 0.2576 
 Extrinsic Motivation 0.0497 0.0402 -0.0024 0.1608 
















Table 3. Mediation analysis in Study 5 for each mediator individually. 







SE Lower Upper 
Requesters’ Discomfort 0.2705 0.1119 0.0775 0.5078 
      
 
 
Requesters’ Gratitude 0.0705 0.0678 -0.0537 0.2171 
      
 
 
Perceived Size of Request 0.1826 0.0836 0.0512 0.3805 
      
 
 
Perceived Discomfort to 
Target of Saying “No” -0.0053 0.0257 -0.0940 0.0264 
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Table 4. Sequential mediation analysis in Study 5 for requesters’ discomfort and 
perceived size of the request. 







SE Lower Upper 
Incentive Condition  Discomfort  Compliance 0.1479 0.0982 0.0194 0.3397 
Incentive Condition  Discomfort  Size  Compliance 0.0182 0.0196 0.0006 0.0712 
Incentive Condition Size  Compliance 0.0199 0.0306 -0.0076 0.0952 
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Appendix A: Supplementary Measures and Analyses for Studies 1-3 
Study 1 
Supplementary Measures.  In addition to our primary measures of predicted and 
actual compliance, we included only 12 exploratory questions.  Seven of these questions 
asked about our primary participants’ expectations of secondary participants’ feelings 
about being approached with this request; five asked about primary participants’ own 
feelings about the task.  Specifically, we had participants indicate on a scale from 1 (Not 
at all) to 7 (Extremely): “How easy do you think it would be for the students you 
approach to say ‘no’ to your request”; “How difficult do you think it would be for the 
students you approach to say ‘no’ to your request”; “How [comfortable, awkward, guilty, 
uncomfortable, and embarrassed] do you think the students you approach would feel 
saying ‘no’ to your request”.  We also had participants indicate on the same scale: “How 
[confident, comfortable, awkward, guilty, and embarrassed] do you feel about 
approaching students with this request?” 
Supplementary Results and Discussion. We analyzed each of the 12 exploratory 
mechanism items described above individually using ANOVA.  Nine of these items 
clearly did not vary across the two conditions (ps>.30).  However, one of the items 
related to primary participants’ perceptions of secondary participants’ reactions to the 
task, and two of the items related to primary participants’ own reactions to the task, 
showed trends of note.  There was a marginally significant trend in which primary 
participants rated secondary participants’ experience saying “no” as less awkward in the 
Monetary Incentive condition (M=3.79) than in the No Incentive condition (M=4.54), 
F(1, 47)=2.99, p=.09, ηp2=.06.  However, this same pattern did not appear in the related 
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items of how embarrassed, guilty, or uncomfortable/comfortable secondary participants 
would feel saying “no,” so this may have been a spurious finding. In addition, there was a 
trend in which primary participants rated their own confidence with the task as higher in 
the Monetary Incentive condition (M=4.92) than in the No Incentive condition, F(1, 
46)=2.74, p=.10, ηp2=.06, and a significant finding in which primary participants reported 
feeling more comfortable with the task in the Monetary Incentive condition (M=5.21) 
than in the No Incentive condition (M=4.17), F(1, 46)=5.69, p=.02, ηp2=.11.   
Study 2 
Supplementary Measures.  In addition to our primary measures of predicted and 
actual compliance, we included only the seven exploratory questions from Study 1 asking 
about our primary participants’ expectations of the secondary participants’ feelings about 
being approached with this request.  Specifically, we had participants indicate on a scale 
from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely): “How easy do you think it would be for the students 
you approach to say ‘no’ to your request”; “How difficult do you think it would be for the 
students you approach to say ‘no’ to your request”; “How [comfortable, awkward, guilty, 
uncomfortable, and embarrassed] do you think the students you approach would feel 
saying ‘no’ to your request”.  
Supplementary Results and Discussion. We analyzed each of the seven 
exploratory mechanism items described above individually. Four of the seven items 
clearly did not vary across condition (all ps>.40).  However, primary participants 
reported that secondary participants would feel less awkward (M=4.25), embarrassed 
(M=3.05), and uncomfortable (M=2.80) saying “no” in the Monetary Incentive condition 
than in the No Incentive condition (Ms= 5.50, 4.30, and 4.05, respectively), all ps<.01 
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and ηp2>.17.   
These findings mirror the trend identified in Study 1 in which participants 
reported that secondary participants would feel less awkward saying “no” in the 
Monetary Incentive condition than in the No Incentive condition.  This finding may 
reflect primary participants’ feelings about the Monetary Incentive condition being a 
generally less awkward and uncomfortable exchange; however, this possibility is 
speculative.   
Study 3 
Supplementary Measures.  In addition to our primary measures of predicted and 
actual compliance, we included only three exploratory questions. On a scale from 1 (Not 
at all) to 7 (Extremely), participants answered the following questions regarding how 
confident they felt as they prepared to get three people to vandalize a library book: “How 
confident are you in your ability to get the students you approach to agree to your 
request?”; “To what extent do you think you will be effective at getting the students you 
approach to agree to your request?”; “How difficult do you consider the task of getting 3 
students to agree to your request?” (reverse-scored).  These three items had a Cronbach’s 
alpha of .79, so they were combined into a single “task confidence” scale.   
Supplementary Results and Discussion 
We conducted an ANOVA to analyze the confidence scale described above.  
Although there was not a significant difference between the three conditions (Monetary 
Incentive, No Incentive, and Candy Bar Incentive) on this scale, F(2, 70)=2.0, p=.14, 
ηp2=.05, the pattern of responses on this scale did mirror participants’ predictions across 
the three conditions.  Participants’ confidence in their task in the No Incentive (M=3.49) 
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and Candy Bar Incentive (M=3.33) conditions were both lower than their confidence in 
the Monetary Incentive condition (M=4.0).  
In sum, these three exploratory items suggest that using money may make 
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Appendix B: Supplementary Measures and Analyses for Study 4 
Results: Questionnaire Scenario  
 Main Effects Analyses. A one-way ANOVA with “likelihood of compliance” as 
our dependent variable revealed a main effect of Incentive Condition (No Incentive, 
Monetary Incentive, Candy Bar Incentive), F(1, 278)=11.52, p<.001, ηp2=.08. 
Participants in the Monetary Incentive condition (M=5.14, SD=1.37) thought the people 
they asked would be more likely to comply with their requests than those in the No 
Incentive condition, (M=4.10, SD=1.74), F(1, 186)=21.11, p<.001, ηp2=.10, and those in 
the Candy Bar Incentive condition, (M=4.76, SD=1.39), F(1, 188)=7.10, p=.059, ηp2=.02.  
The same analyses were conducted for each of our five mechanism variables 
(business exchange orientation, power, self-efficacy, extrinsic motivation, and 
reciprocity). A significant effect of Incentive Condition emerged for only two of our five 
scales: business exchange orientation (F[2, 278]=5.52, p=.004, ηp2=.04) and extrinsic 
motivation (F([2, 278]=5.52, p=.004, ηp2=.04).  There were no significant differences by 
condition on our power (p>.45), self-efficacy (p>.55), or indebtedness (p>.43) scales. 
Mirroring our findings on predicted compliance, participants in the Monetary 
Incentive condition (M=5.39, SD=1.17) adopted more of a business exchange orientation 
than participants in the No Incentive condition (M=3.81, SD=1.23), F(1, 186)=33.82, 
p<.001, ηp2=.15, and participants in the Candy Bar Incentive condition (M=5.00, 
SD=1.36), F(1, 188)=4.35, p=.04, ηp2=.02. 
Participants in the Monetary Incentive condition (M=5.06, SD=1.24) also thought 
that their targets would be more motivated by extrinsic incentives than participants in the 
No Incentive condition (M=4.46, SD=1.44), F(1, 186)=9.15, p=.003, ηp2=.05.  However, 
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there was no significant difference between the Monetary Incentive and Candy Bar 
Incentive conditions on expectations of extrinsic motivation (p>.62).   
 Mediation Analysis. We conducted a separate mediation analysis for each 
mediator using the PROCESS macro for SPSS with incentive condition as our IV, 
likelihood of compliance as our DV, and each of our five mechanism scales (business 
exchange orientation, power, self-efficacy, extrinsic motivation, and reciprocity) as our 
potential mediators (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).  Because incentive condition is a 
multicategorical IV, dummy codes for the No Incentive versus Monetary Incentive (D1) 
and No Incentive versus Candy Incentive conditions (D2) were included as predictors 
(Hayes & Preacher, 2014).  In these analyses, the only 95% bias-corrected confidence 
intervals that did not include zero were the indirect effect of business exchange 
orientation and extrinsic motivation; the 95% confidence intervals for the remaining three 
scales all included zero (see Table B1). We subsequently conducted a multiple mediator 
analysis with these latter two mediators and found that when both potential mediators 
were entered into the analysis, only the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for 
business exchange did not include zero (see Table B2).  In other words, mediation was 
confirmed for business exchange frame, but not for extrinsic motivation. All of these 





 Money and Compliance 78 
Table B1. Mediation analysis for Questionnaire Scenario only in Study 4 with dummy 
codes for No Incentive vs. Money (D1) and No Incentive vs. Candy (D2) for each 
mediator individually. 
 
      
Bias Corrected 
95% CI 




SE Lower Upper 
D1  Business Exchange Orientation 0.2588 0.1015 0.0936 0.4942 
D2  Business Exchange Orientation 0.1710 0.0742 0.0517 0.3424 
 
      
 
 
D1  Power 0.1042 0.1165 -0.1497 0.3236 
D2  Power 0.1428 0.1199 -0.1187 0.3743 
 
      
 
 
D1  Self-Efficacy -0.0597 0.0666 -0.1994 0.0617 
D2  Self-Efficacy -0.0690 0.0653 -0.2062 0.0499 
 
      
 
 
D1  Extrinsic Motivation 0.1107 0.0585 0.0219 0.2624 
D2  Extrinsic Motivation 0.0941 0.0574 0.0119 0.2534 
 
      
 
 
D1  Indebtedness -0.0452 0.0420 -0.1499 0.0144 
D2  Indebtedness -0.0310 0.0402 -0.1312 0.0330 
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Table B2. Multiple-mediator analysis for Questionnaire Scenario comparing only 
business exchange frame to extrinsic incentives in Study 4 with dummy codes for No 
Incentive vs. Money (D1) and No Incentive vs. Candy (D2). 
 
      
Bias Corrected 
95% CI 




SE Lower Upper 
D1  Business Exchange Orientation 0.2068 0.1100 0.0054 0.4279 
 Extrinsic Motivation 0.0587 0.0559 -0.0299 0.1985 
D2  Business Exchange Orientation 0.1367 0.0795 0.0074 0.3201 
 Extrinsic Motivation 0.0499 0.0527 -0.0250 0.1971 
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Results: Book Vandalism Scenario  
 Main Effects Analyses. A one-way ANOVA with “likelihood of compliance” as 
our dependent variable revealed a main effect of Incentive Condition (No Incentive, 
Monetary Incentive, Candy Bar Incentive), F(1, 278)=3.45, p=.03, ηp2=.02. Participants 
in the Monetary Incentive condition (M=4.26, SD=1.76) thought the people they asked 
would be more likely to comply with their requests than those in the No Incentive 
condition, (M=3.59, SD=1.95), F(1, 186)=6.04, p=.02, ηp2=.03, and those in the Candy 
Bar Incentive condition, (M=3.72, SD=1.84), F(1, 188)=4.23, p=.04, ηp2=.02.  
The same analyses were conducted for each of our five mechanism variables 
(business exchange orientation, power, self-efficacy, extrinsic motivation, and 
reciprocity). A significant effect of Incentive Condition emerged for only business 
exchange orientation (F[2, 278]=17.97, p<.001, ηp2=.11), along with a marginally 
significant effect for extrinsic motivation (F([2, 278]=2.45, p=.09, ηp2=.02).  There were 
no significant differences by condition for our power (p>.90), self-efficacy (p>.92), or 
indebtedness (p>.80) scales. 
Mirroring our findings on predicted compliance, participants in the Monetary 
Incentive condition (M=4.75, SD=1.57) adopted more of a business exchange orientation 
than participants in the No Incentive condition (M=3.38, SD=1.60), F(1, 186)=35.33, 
p<.001, ηp2=.16, and participants in the Candy Bar Incentive condition (M=4.24, 
SD=1.59), F(1, 188)=4.99, p=.03, ηp2=.03. 
Participants in the Monetary Incentive condition (M=4.57, SD=1.36) also thought 
that their targets would be more motivated by extrinsic incentives than participants in the 
No Incentive condition (M=4.12, SD=1.65), F(1, 186)=4.20, p=.04, ηp2=.02.  However, 
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there was no significant difference between the Monetary Incentive and Candy Bar 
Incentive conditions on expectations of extrinsic motivation (p>.72).   
 Mediation Analysis. We conducted a separate mediation analysis for each 
mediator using the PROCESS macro for SPSS with incentive condition as our IV, 
likelihood of compliance as our DV, and each of our five mechanism scales (business 
exchange orientation, power, self-efficacy, extrinsic motivation, and reciprocity) as our 
potential mediators (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).  Because incentive condition is a 
multicategorical IV, dummy codes for the No Incentive versus Monetary Incentive (D1) 
and No Incentive versus Candy Incentive conditions (D2) were included as predictors 
(Hayes & Preacher, 2014).  In these analyses, the only 95% bias-corrected confidence 
interval that did not include zero on both factors was the indirect effect of business 
exchange orientation. The 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the indirect effect 
of extrinsic motivation included the 95% when comparing the Candy Incentive to No 
Incentive conditions (D2), but not when comparing the Monetary Incentive to No 
Incentive conditions (D1). The confidence intervals for the remaining three scales all 
included zero (see Table B3). We subsequently conducted a multiple mediator analysis 
with business exchange and extrinsic motivation and found that when both potential 
mediators were entered into the analysis, only the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval 
for business exchange did not include zero (see Table B4).  In other words, mediation 
was once again confirmed for business exchange frame, but not for extrinsic motivation. 
All of these results remained unchanged when controlling for communal orientation.   
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Table B3. Mediation analysis for Book Vandalism Scenario only in Study 4 with dummy 
codes for No Incentive vs. Money (D1) and No Incentive vs. Candy (D2) for each 
mediator individually. 
 
      
Bias Corrected 
95% CI 




SE Lower Upper 
D1  Business Exchange Orientation 0.5127 0.1297 0.2888 0.7823 
D2  Business Exchange Orientation 0.3221 0.1097 0.1403 0.5803 
 
      
 
 
D1  Power -0.0308 0.1597 -0.3656 0.2649 
D2  Power -0.0726 0.1637 -0.3872 0.2822 
 
      
 
 
D1  Self-Efficacy -0.0178 0.0560 -0.1853 0.0591 
D2  Self-Efficacy -0.0156 0.0513 -0.1398 0.0809 
 
      
 
 
D1  Extrinsic Motivation 0.1054 0.0698 0.0101 0.2900 
D2  Extrinsic Motivation 0.0885 0.0662 -0.0084 0.2540 
 
      
 
 
D1  Indebtedness -0.0173 0.0400 -0.1364 0.0388 
D2  Indebtedness 0.0025 0.0382 -0.0682 0.0895 
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Table B4. Multiple-mediator analysis for Questionnaire Scenario only comparing 
business exchange frame to extrinsic incentives in Study 4 with dummy codes for No 
Incentive vs. Money (D1) and No Incentive vs. Candy (D2). 
 
      
Bias Corrected 
95% CI 




SE Lower Upper 
D1  Business Exchange Orientation 0.4822 0.1373 0.2370 0.7894 
 Extrinsic Motivation 0.0213 0.0506 -0.0518 0.1608 
D2  Business Exchange Orientation 0.3029 0.1129 0.1188 0.5625 
 Extrinsic Motivation 0.0179 0.0446 -0.0475 0.1480 
N=281; 1000 Bootstrap Resamples    
 
 
 
 
 
